Impact Fees for a Developing Wisconsin by Mulcahy, Charles C. & Zimet, Michelle J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 79
Issue 3 Spring 1996: Wisconsin Issue Article 6
Impact Fees for a Developing Wisconsin
Charles C. Mulcahy
Michelle J. Zimet
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Charles C. Mulcahy and Michelle J. Zimet, Impact Fees for a Developing Wisconsin, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 759 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol79/iss3/6
IMPACT FEES FOR A DEVELOPING
WISCONSIN
CHARLES C. MULCAHY* AND MICHELLE I. ZIMET *
I. INTRODUCTION
Local governments in Wisconsin and nationwide are searching for
funding to build or expand public facilities to accommodate new
development. The gap between available funds and the cost of new
development is dramatic. Estimates indicate that the infrastructure
deficiencies in the United States are now equal in size to the national
budget deficit.' The shortfall of funding for the construction of public
facilities needed to accommodate new and expanded development is
* Charles C. Mulcahy has played an active role concerning local government issues in
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has been admitted to the Bar in Wisconsin and Florida. Mr. Mulcahy served as an adjunct
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Innovation Center at Marquette University in Milwaukee and is a partner in the law firm of
Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, S.C. Mr. Mulcahy has been a frequent contributor to the
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American Institute of Certified Planners, and has been admitted to the bar in Illinois,
California, and Florida. Ms. Zimet has substantial experience in drafting impact fee
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1. EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT
AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA xxxiv (Robert H. Freilich & David W.
Bushek eds., 1995) [hereinafter EXACTIONS]. For example, Barton-Aschman Associates, Inc.,
(a transportation, engineering, and planning firm) estimates a $95,000,000 infrastructure defi-
ciency from 1995 to 2010 for Waukesha County, Wisconsin.
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primarily the result of three factors:
A. Substantially curtailed subsidies of local government public
facilities by federal and state governments;
B. Federal and state mandates that have increased construction
costs of public facilities; and
C. The combined effect of stagnated incomes and a property tax
revolt.
2
Unless alternative funding sources are developed to accommodate new
development, the funding gap and revenue shortfall will result in a
deteriorating infrastructure quality and a further congestion of existing
public facilities.
Rather than revisit the arguments, pro and con,3 and the myths and
realities of impact fees,4 this Article will focus on the following:
A. The historic deployment of exactions;
B. Legal constraints on the imposition of impact fee exactions;
C. Constitutional constraints on impact fees;
D. The application of constitutional principles; and
E. Recommended provisions and requirements of Wisconsin law
for impact fee ordinances.
Local governments in the United States are generally
empowered to regulate land use and to provide adequate public
facilities to serve new growth. To meet the substantial costs of
providing new roads, schools, and other public facilities to serve
new development, local governments have been forced to utilize
innovative new methods of capital facilities financing. Local
governments have increasingly required developers to contribute
public facilities or pay a proportionate cost of those facilities to
offset the impact of proposed development on capital facilities.
Exactions take the form of:
A. Mandatory dedications of land for roads, schools, or parks as
a condition of plat or building permit approval;
B. Fees in lieu of mandatory dedication;
C. Water or sewer connection fees;
D. Special assessments; and
E. Impact fees.
The underlying principle of exactions is that those who benefit from
2. Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, in EXACTIONS,
supra note 1, at 87-88.
3. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, NEW LAW RELATING TO THE
IMPOSITION OF IMPACT FEES ON DEVELOPERS OF LAND, (1993 Wisconsin Act 305).
Information Memorandum 94-5 (1994).
4. Nelson, supra note 2, at 92-96.
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capital improvements should pay the costs of constructing those facilities.
The concept is not new.5 Indeed, for many years, local governments
have tried to shift the cost of providing services to new growth and
development to the developer and the new residents who create the
costs. The rationale behind exactions is that since taxpayers have
already paid for existing infrastructure, it is fair that additional develop-
ment should not be permitted unless developers contribute for new or
expanded facilities that must be made available to service new growth.
Exactions, therefore, are not only an equitable means of financing public
facilities, but they also guarantee the timely installation of the facilities.
Although Wisconsin courts have historically approved various types
of exactions that address the cost of public facilities required by
development, case law provides no clear and uniform standards to assist
in the validation of these exactions. Local government officials, real
estate developers, and other interested parties turned to the state
legislature to provide statutory standards for determining the validity of
an impact fee.
A. Description of Statute and Legislative History
In 1993, responding to the pressure placed on local governments to
satisfy the escalating demand for public facilities and the concomitant
reduction in the sources of revenue to fund such facilities, the Assembly
Committee on Ways and Means of the Wisconsin Legislature appointed
a Subcommittee on Impact Fees. In May 1993, the Subcommittee
informally approved goals for drafting a Wisconsin impact fee law.
Those goals were to draft laws to provide:
1. Clear statutory authority for the imposition of impact fees by
local governments (Previously, authority for impact fees was
generally derived from the home rule or police powers, or both,
of local government units.);
2. Statutory standards for determining the validity of an impact
fee (Previously, court decisions were vague concerning the
general standards for determining the validity of an impact fee in
Wisconsin. The Subcommittee on Impact Fees sought to
eliminate the uncertainty involved in imposing impact fees and to
minimize potential litigation by land developers challenging the
validity of impact fee ordinances.);
3. Clear authorization of which local government units may
5. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
1996]
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impose impact fees and what types of impact fees may be
imposed;
4. Statutory notice and public hearing requirements before an
impact fee ordinance may be enacted; and
5. Authority for local government units to exempt low-cost
housing from impact fees or to impose reduced impact fees on
low-cost housing.
6
As a result of the Subcommittee's work, the Wisconsin legislature
adopted the Wisconsin Impact Fee Act in 1994 as an innovative
mechanism that enables Wisconsin political subdivisions to shift the costs
of providing public facilities to those who create the need for them.
Codified as Wisconsin Statutes section 66.55, the law provides that local
governments may enact ordinances, which permit them to impose impact
fees on developers, to cover some or all of the capital costs necessary to
accommodate new development. In addition to setting forth the
authority of Wisconsin local governments to enact impact fee ordinances,
section 66.55 also provides the minimum standards that must be met in
any ordinance enacted pursuant to that authority.
B. Standards for a Valid Impact Fee
Impact fees imposed under an ordinance adopted by a local
government pursuant to the Impact Fee Law:
(a) Shall bear a rational relationship to the need for new,
expanded or improved public facilities that are required to serve
land development.
(b) May not exceed the proportionate share of the capital costs
that are required to serve land development, as compared to
existing uses of land within the political subdivision.
(c) Shall be based upon actual capital costs or reasonable
estimates of capital costs for new, expanded or improved public
facilities.
(d) Shall be reduced to compensate for other capital costs
imposed by the political subdivision with respect to land develop-
ment to provide or pay for public facilities . .. .
(e) Shall be reduced to compensate for moneys received from
the federal or state government specifically to provide or pay for
the public facilities for which the impact fees are imposed.
6. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, supra note 3, at 7-8.
7. In that regard, impact fees may not be imposed in an amount that recovers more than
the net cost to the local government unit of providing the public facilities where there may
also be special assessments, special charges, or other impositions.
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(f) May not include amounts necessary to address existing
deficiencies in public facilities. [The impact fees must be based
upon new developments only.]
(g) Shall be payable by the developer to the political subdivision,
either in full or in instalment payments ... before a building
permit may be issued or other required approval may be given by
the political subdivision.'
Under the new law, impact fees are authorized through ordinances
that must comply with the above described provisions. The ordinances
can impose different impact fees on separate types of development or
impose different impact fees in various areas of the local government
unit, if such differences are justified under the standards listed above.
The impact fee law also authorizes local governments to exempt or
provide a reduction in the amount of impact fees on land development
related to low-cost housing. The cost of such reduction or elimination
of impact fees for low-cost housing, however, may not be covered by
increasing impact fees on other developments. 9
C. Approved Costs Funded With Impact Fees
Impact fees may be imposed to pay for some or all of the capital cost
to construct, expand, or improve public facilities. "Public facilities" are
defined in the statute to mean highways and other transportation
facilities; traffic control devices; facilities for collecting and treating
sewage; facilities for collecting and treating storm and surface water;
facilities for pumping, storing, and distributing water; parks, playgrounds,
and other recreational facilities; solid waste and recycling facilities; fire
protection facilities; law enforcement facilities; emergency medical
facilities; and libraries. (The law specifically excludes facilities owned by
a school district.) The law also authorizes certain noncapital costs to be
funded with impact fees. The statute provides that legal, engineering,
and design costs not exceed ten percent of "capital costs" unless the
political subdivision can demonstrate that these costs directly relating to
public improvements involve more than ten percent of the capital
costs. 0
8. WIS. STAT. § 66.55(6) (1993-94).
9. Id. § 66.55(7).
10. Id. § 66.55(1).
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D. Separation of Impact Fee Revenues
Under the law, impact fees must be placed in a segregated interest
bearing account and must be accounted for separately from the other
funds of the local government unit. The impact fees and interest earned
on them may only be expended for capital costs for which the impact
fees are imposed. The local government unit must use the impact fee
within a reasonable period of time or it will be required to refund the
unused amounts to the current owner of the property. Impact fee
ordinances are required to identify the type of public facility and the
reasonable time periods within which impact fees must be expended or
refunded."
E. Appeal of Procedure
An impact fee ordinance adopted pursuant to the Wisconsin Impact
Fee Law must specify an appeals procedure "under which a develop-
er... has the right to contest the amount, collection or use of the impact
fee" imposed by the local government unit.12
F Approval Procedure for Impact Ordinances - Needs Assessment
The Impact Fee Law requires that the adopting local government
prepare a "needs assessment" for the public facilities for which it is
anticipated the impact fees may be imposed. The needs assessment must
identify the new public facilities, improvements, or expansions of existing
public facilities that will be required because of land development. This
identification must be based upon explicitly identified service standards
for the public facilities. The needs assessment must identify existing
deficiencies in the quantity and quality of public facilities because impact
fees may not be imposed on new development to pay for existing
deficiencies in either the quantity or quality of public facilities. 3 A
local government must hold a public hearing on the proposed ordinance
before enactment and publish notice specifying where a copy of the
public facility needs assessment and the proposed ordinance may be
obtained."
11. Id. § 66.55(9).
12. Id. § 66.55(10).
13. Id. § 66.55(4).
14. Id. § 66.55(3).
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EXACTIONS
Subdivision exactions were the earliest form of exaction accepted by
courts as a means for making a new development responsible for serving
itself. Early examples of subdivision exactions include mandatory
dedication of subdivision roads, utility easements, and parks, which were
levied as conditions of development approval. What was originally and
principally a method of guaranteeing the timely installation of physical
improvements needed on-site to meet the demands created by new
development has evolved into systems for accumulating municipal funds
with which to construct capital facilities in the future. The dedication of
facilities as a condition of development approval is now a fine art, as
developers routinely negotiate with local governments by offering a
gamut of amenities and improvements.
Historically, exactions were limited to on-site requirements, and
dedications or public improvements were targeted for the actual parcel
proposed for development. As growth pressures and inadequate capital
facilities funding gradually intensified public concern over the impacts of
new growth and development, local governments began to exact
contributions towards off-site infrastructure as conditions for develop-
ment approval. Requirements for off-site improvements are now firmly
entrenched in contemporary land development regulations. Developers
now contribute to improvements, such as road intersections, lift stations,
and oversized sewer and water mains, that serve their development, but
which may be located some distance away.
A. Types of Exactions
Many local governments have adopted various forms of developer
exactions as a means of financing and guaranteeing the timely installa-
tion of public facilities. Funding sources that are exacted as a condition
of development approval now include impact fees, 15 special assess-
ments, 6 development agreements, 17 user fees and tolls," and connec-
15. Impact fees refer to charges imposed by a local government on new development as
a condition for development approval, to fund a proportionate share of the cost of public
facilities needed to serve new development.
16. Special assessments tax properties, which benefit from capital improvements, a pro
rata share of the facilities' costs. The premise behind special assessments is that newly
constructed public facilities bestow a special benefit, above that incurring to the general public,
to the owners of property adjacent to newly constructed public facilities.
17. Development agreements are agreements by which development rights are
guaranteed for a set term of years in return for advance funding, which is used to construct
1996]
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tion fees.19 No matter what form they assume, however, development
exactions are conditions of development approval imposed by local
governments to mitigate the otherwise negative impacts of development,
and all allocate the cost of capital improvements to the developers and
their customers who need and benefit from the facilities.
As many local governments throughout the United States have come
to recognize, continued growth and prosperity depends upon the ability
of the community to provide, in a timely manner, those public facilities
needed to serve new growth and development. They have come to
realize that quality of life can be eroded by traffic congestion, air and
water pollution, or other manifestations of inadequate public facilities,
which in turn ultimately diminish the attractiveness of an area to both
residents and developers.
B. Other Sources of Revenue
The key to successful funding of public facilities for new development
is a predictable planning process that determines facilities' needs in
advance of demand, identifies the cost of needed facilities, and equitably
allocates that cost among those who are benefitted. General revenues
(e.g., sales taxes, property taxes, and real estate transfer taxes) and
special revenues (e.g., special assessments and user fees) are funding
vehicles by which existing residents can also equitably share in the cost
of upgrading public facilities that are of general benefit.
C. Impact Fees
Impact fees are an increasingly popular means by which exactions for
new development are imposed, and their mechanics are now well
understood." For example, the methodology and underpinnings of
transportation impact fees are fairly predictable. Road impact fees are
public infrastructure, by the developer. The agreement generally contains provisions
concerning vested rights, limits on future exactions, cooperation in bond financing, and future
assignment. The agreements guarantee a landowner's right to develop in accordance with law
that exists at the time and state the dollar amount of the landowner's obligation for infrastruc-
ture costs.
18. User fees and tolls are linked to actual use and are charges incident to receiving a
service. The fees and tolls are used to repay the capital cost of building and operating the
facility.
19. Connection fees are charges that a new customer of a utility pays for a share of the
capital cost of the utility's facilities.
20. In Florida, for example, impact fees have been used to finance the provision of a
variety of capital facilities, including potable water, sewers, schools, solid waste disposal, librar-
ies, law enforcement, and cemeteries.
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charged to new development to pay for the cost of improving roads to
serve the additional traffic generated by the new development. These
one-time fees are based on traffic studies that determine future needs.
The fee rates are calculated based on the number of trips generated by
various land uses and the cost of constructing roadway capacity to
accommodate those trips. Impact fees to finance transportation facilities
have been particularly popular because they are so quantifiable.
New growth and development generates a known quantity of traffic
(x number of trips generated per unit of development traveling a
particular distance per average trip). This demand for trafficways is
quantifiable in terms of the number of trips of a particular length and is
easily translated into the number of additional roads that is required in
order to provide safe and efficient vehicular movement at the level of
service selected by the community. By calculating the cost per unit of
additional roads, the cost of a particular development's impact on roads
can be identified with a fair degree of precision, and a charge can be
collected to pay for the required improvements. The fees are usually
published in tables that show the fee per dwelling unit for residential
developments and the fee per square foot for commercial and industrial
developments.
III. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE IMPOSITION OF IMPACT FEE
EXACTIONS
Impact fees have principally evolved in California, Florida, and other
high growth areas where staggering increases in development have
pressured the capacity of local governments to provide adequate public
facilities. As a result, these are the states that have the most extensive
practical and legal experience with the concept of impact fees, and these
are the states to which other governments look in evaluating the legal
and practical implications of a program of exactions by impact.
However, even states with less extreme growth experience have funding
shortfalls and have accepted impact fees as a viable alternative to
increasing property taxes. Their courts have expressly confirmed the
legality of the concept.
Two issues control the legality of the impact fee or exaction. First,
the local government must possess the authority to impose the fee as a
condition of development approval. Second, the fee must be constitu-
tional. While any regulation is generally subject to the constraints of the
Wisconsin and United .States Constitutions, the substantive and
procedural due process and the equal protection clauses are the principle
applicable constraints.
1996]
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A. Legal Authority
One of the major forces shaping modern impact fee ordinances is
new state legislation. To date, at least twenty states have enacted impact
fee legislation (i.e., Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin)."' Within those states, the legislation is usually
either limited in its application to certain specified jurisdictions or to
specific types of public improvements.
1. Home Rule Authority
The authority of local government to regulate the use of land is
derived from the police power of the states to regulate the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare. This power was traditionally delegated to
local governments through specific enabling acts. Currently, most states
have granted "home rule" powers to local governments in recognition of
the sophistication of local government and the complexity of the issues
they face.
Home rule authority is usually sufficient to provide those local
governments with the authority to adopt an exaction program.
Non-home rule units may have to rely on other statutory authority or
police power case law to support an exaction-type ordinance. Nation-
wide, the pattern has been the adoption of exaction programs without
specific statutory authority. For example, many communities have
implemented exactions through subdivision or annexation control.
Financing of public roads and other related public improvements has
historically been authorized through local subdivision regulation and
dedication requirements, or through special assessments. Broad
authority exists for the provision of public facilities under subdivision
dedication statutes and special assessment statutes.22
However, absent specific statutory authority, the powers of local
governments in Wisconsin have been broadly interpreted to provide for
the health, safety, and welfare of the public. 23 Ordinances adopted by
local governments pursuant to their home rule authority and police
powers will be upheld unless they conflict directly with a state law on the
21. Nelson, supra note 2, at 101. See also the chart analyzing legislation on a state by
state basis shown in Appendix 1.
22. WiS. STAT. chs. 66, 236 (1993-94).
23. Johnston v. City of Sheboygan, 30 Wis. 2d 179, 185-86, 140 N.W.2d 247, 251 (1966).
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same subject or are found to be unreasonable or arbitrary.24 Municipal-
ities may enact ordinances in the same field or on the same subject
covered by state legislation where such ordinances complement the statelegislation.'
In Wisconsin, there are now explicit statutory provisions that grant
local governments the authority to impose non-subdivision related
exactions as a means of mitigating the fiscal impact of growth.
Wisconsin Statutes section 66.55 grants this authority but also contains
mandatory procedural and substantive requirements.
2. Dillon's Rule
In a Dillon's Rule state, such as Arkansas, Kentucky, Utah, Vermont,
and Virginia, local governments must look towards either police powers
or home rule powers as sources for exaction authority. Dillon's Rule
states:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and
no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation, - not simply
convenient, but indispensable. 6
Under this scheme, when statutes do not expressly authorize local
governments to adopt exactions, the analysis must focus on whether any
authority is implied. The power to adopt and implement an exactions
program in those states must therefore be found either in the express
language of the state zoning and planning enabling legislation or must be
necessarily implied or incident to the powers expressly granted to the
local government so that the zoning and planning powers may be
effectuated.
3. Case Law and Statutes Providing Legal Authority for Impact Fees
Although the imposition of impact fees has now been specifically
codified in Wisconsin Statutes section 66.55, the authority for imposition
of similar exactions had already existed in Wisconsin law. The increasing
influx of people to suburban communities in the 1950s and 1960s, and
24. City of Milwaukee v. Piscuine, 18 Wis. 2d 599, 602-03, 119 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1963).
25. City of Milwaukee v. Childs Co., 195 Wis. 148, 151,217 N.W. 703, 704-05 (1928).
26. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 237 (5th ed. 1911).
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the rapid growth of those communities, resulted in provision by the
legislature of a means for managing the growth and providing for the
increased necessary services through the enactment of local ordinances.
In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls,2 7 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that an ordinance enacted pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes
section 236.45, which required the dedication of land by a subdivider for
open spaces or schools, was a constitutional exercise of the police power.
Likewise, the court determined that requiring a payment in lieu of actual
dedication was constitutional. Dedication fees are equally legitimate
when imposed pursuant to zoning ordinances that are enacted for the
purpose of "'facilitat[ing] the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements."'2
Wisconsin has maintained an expansive attitude toward the applica-
tion of police power by local municipalities. 29 That expansive treatment
of municipal police power translates into a significant amount of
authority to impose fees or assessments for the purpose of funding a
variety of public improvements. The validity of special assessments,
which are imposed directly on a property owner, is dependent upon the
degree to which the funded improvement specifically benefitted that
particular property.
The legislature has established guidelines for the amount of special
assessments that may be imposed under circumstances where the
municipality justifies the assessments through police power and nonpolice
power authority. Wisconsin Statutes section 66.60(1)(a) and (b) provides
that any municipality may levy and collect special assessments for
"special benefits" conferred from municipal work or improvements. The
assessment shall not exceed the value of the benefits conferred when
taxing power authority is used as the basis for the assessment. When
police power is used, however, the assessment shall be upon a "reason-
able basis." According to the court in CIT Group/Equipment Financing,
Inc. v. Village of Germantown,3" such reasonableness requires that an
assessment made under the police power "fairly apportion the cost [of
an improvement and] not arbitrarily or capriciously burden any group of
27. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
28. Black v. City of Waukesha, 125 Wis. 2d 254, 256, 371 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Ct. App.
1985) (quoting Wis. STAT. § 62.23(7)(c)) (expanding ruling in Jordan).
29. Peterson v. City of New Berlin, 154 Wis. 2d 365, 370,453 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Ct. App.
1990) (a municipality's police power is broad, and courts may intercede only if the exercise of
that power is clearly unreasonable).
30. 163 Wis. 2d 426,471 N.W.2d 610 (Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1099 (1992).
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property owners."'" When police power is used, the municipality need
not show that the property is benefitted in an amount equal to the dollar
amount assessed.32 There are limitations on the imposition of assess-
ments under the police power, however, as the courts have cautioned
that the adopted plan of assessment must be "'fair and equitable and
such that it will bring about an assessment in proportion to the benefits
accruing."'33
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON IMPACT FEES
The most common constitutional challenges to impact fees are the
arguments that they are unfair, arbitrary, unreasonable, or without any
rational basis, in violation of developers' due process rights, or that they
are discriminatory in violation of the equal protection clauses of the state
and federal constitutions.
A. Equal Protection
The thrust of an equal protection challenge to a land use regulation
is that a government regulation effectuates invidious discrimination
against a class of individuals.' A municipal regulation will be constitu-
tional under the equal protection clause only so long as it is supported
by a rational basis.3 The courts will apply a stricter standard of judicial
review if a suspect class or a fundamental interest is affected. To date,
courts have not found property rights to be fundamental interests and,
therefore, a rational basis level of scrutiny is applied to most zoning
ordinances.36 Developers have often argued unsuccessfully that manda-
tory impact fees illegally discriminate against new development.37
Equal protection claims have usually been rejected in the past because
an impact fee program requires that new development only pay its fair
31. Id. at 437, 471 N.W.2d at 614 (citing Village of Egg Harbor v. Mariner Group, Inc.,
156 Wis. 2d 568, 573, 457 N.W.2d 519, 521-22 (Ct. App. 1990)).
32. Sippel v. City of St. Francis, 164 Wis. 2d 527, 540, 476 N.W.2d 579, 585 (Ct. App.
1991) (citing GeIhaus & Brost, Inc. v. City of Medford, 144 Wis. 2d 48, 50, 423 N.W.2d 180,
182 (Ct. App. 1988)).
33. Id. (quoting In re Installation of Storm Sewers v. City of Glendale, 79 Wis. 2d 279,
287, 253 N.W.2d 521, 525 (1977)).
34. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
35. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
36. See, e.g., Madison Landfills, Inc. v. Dane County, 183 Wis. 2d 282, 515 N.W.2d 322
(Ct. App. 1994).
37. See, e.g., Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1977).
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share of the cost of capital improvements and because all new develop-
ment is treated equally under a formula or schedule of fees.
A potential problem for the future, however, is that as fees are used
to finance an increasing number of facilities and improvements,
cumulating to thousands of dollars per residential unit, an increasing
number of hardship exceptions will likely be negotiated. Impact fee
ordinances that are implemented on an ad hoc basis will be susceptible
to equal protection challenges, especially if the effect of a substantial
surcharge on all new developments discriminates against low and
moderate income potential home buyers.38
The Equal Protection Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits
the state from treating similarly situated individuals dissimilarly. As in
federal law, absent the existence of a fundamental interest or a suspect
classification, satisfying equal protection depends on whether a rational
basis for the legislation is present.39 The test for evaluating equal
protection is not merely to determine whether inequality results from a
classification, but whether there is any rational and reasonable justifica-
tion for the classification.4"
More specifically, Wisconsin courts employ a five point test to
determine whether a governmental enactment satisfies equal protection:
(1) All classifications must be based upon substantial distinctions
which make one class really different from another. (2) The
classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law.
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circum-
stances only.
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to
each member thereof...
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be so far different
from those of other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the
propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially
different legislation.4'
38. See discussion infra of exemption of affordable housing at part VI.L.1.
39. In re Guardianship of Nelson v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 98 Wis. 2d
261, 296 N.W.2d 736 (1980); Rubin v. City of Wauwatosa, 116 Wis. 2d 305, 342 N.W.2d 451
(Ct. App. 1983).
40. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975);
Village of Oregon v. Waldofsky, 177 Wis. 2d 412, 501 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1993).
41. Dane County v. McManus, 55 Wis. 2d 413, 423, 198 N.W.2d 667, 672-73 (1972)
(quoted in Dog Fed'n of Wis., Inc. v. City of S. Milwaukee, 178 Wis. 2d 353, 366, 504 N.W.2d
375, 380 (Ct. App. 1993)) (alteration in original); see also Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 19,
218 N.W.2d 734, 742 (1974).
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In view of these criteria, Wisconsin courts generally view any reasonable
basis for a classification as legitimating the given legislation.42
B. Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process requires that governmental powers affecting
private rights and interests be exercised in a fundamentally fair fashion.
In order for an ordinance to meet the standards of substantive due
process, it must bear a "substantial relationship" to the public purpose
(i.e., the public health, safety, and welfare sought to be achieved).43
The Supreme Court discussed the substantive nature of due process of
law in relation to restrictions on land use in Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge' as follows:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with
the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character
of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such
restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.'
Substantive due process is a standard that has provided the backbone of
land use controls for over fifty years and ensures that the police power
is sufficiently broad to protect the public welfare from more than just
offensive and noxious activities.
In Wisconsin, the right to substantive due process "requires that a
law not be 'unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to
be obtained.' 4 6 For state action to comply with due process it must
pass the reasonable or rational relationship test. The test is whether the
means chosen have a reasonable and rational relationship to the purpose
or object of the enactment.47 This remains the standard consistently
used by the Wisconsin courts in evaluating the validity of a governmental
unit's exercise of its police power.48
42. See State ex rel Niederer v. Cady, 72 Wis. 2d 311, 240 N.W.2d 626 (1976).
43. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding the
constitutional validity of zoning as an appropriate exercise of the police power, provided that
the zoning was substantially related to the public health, safety, and welfare).
44. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
45. Id. at 188.
46. Yotvat v. Roth, 95 Wis. 2d 357, 372, 290 N.W.2d 524, 532 (Ct. App. 1980) (quoting
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
47. State v. Jackman, 60 Wis. 2d 700, 211 N.W.2d 480 (1973).
48. State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989); State v. Hermann, 164
Wis. 2d 269,474 N.W.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1991): State v. Tarantino, 157 Wis. 2d 199,458 N.W.2d
582 (Ct. App. 1990): Oliver v. Travelers Ins. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 644, 309 N.W.2d 383 (Ct. App.
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From a substantive due process of law perspective, the issue is
whether an exaction by impact is "reasonable," and whether the local
government has demonstrated a linkage between the imposition of the
fee and the burden imposed by new development. Put another way, the
government must ensure that new developments are not paying more
than their fair share of the costs of such improvements.
C. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is a constitutional concept that embodies the
basic notion of fairness. Accordingly, procedural due process requires
that governmental power affecting private rights and interests be
exercised in a fundamentally just fashion. The government regulation
must treat people fairly so they know their concerns will be given due
consideration. At a minimum, fundamental due process requires
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard and provides that
governmental decisions should be made on the basis of merit, using
defined standards.
To satisfy the standard of procedural due process, an ordinance must
be fair; it must provide procedures and standards in terms that are clear,
concise, and intelligible to persons of common intelligence. A police
power regulation will therefore violate the due process clause if it "either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application."" Therefore, an impact fee ordinance must be
carefully drawn and must contain clear definitions and definitive
procedures.
V. APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Application of the constitutional principles of due process have taken
on a particular twist in the context of impact fees. The standards
generally applied by states ensure that to varying degrees, a "substantial
relationship" exists between the regulatory requirements and the public
purposes for which they were imposed. As subdivision and development
regulations and other exactions by impact proliferated, the courts
developed three standards to ensure that this substantial relationship
exists. The three standards that state courts have employed in determin-
ing the constitutionality of exactions examine whether the fee: (1) is
1981).
49. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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specifically and uniquely attributable, (2) bears a reasonable relationship,
or (3) has a rational nexus with the impact of the new development.
Under each standard, new development must create a demand for a new
capital facility, and a linkage must exist between this new development
and the need for the new facilities. There must also be some assurance
that sufficient benefit accrues to the particular developer that pays the
fee.
A. "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable" Standard
The first standard is the toughest to meet and requires the local
government to prove that the need for the capital improvement is
specifically and uniquely attributable to the activity of a particular
developer. In order for a mandatory dedication to be a valid exercise of
police power in some states (most notably Illinois), local governments
have faced the difficult burden of proving that the need for the capital
improvement was "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
development of a particular subdivision." Interestingly, although the
30-year old specifically and uniquely attributable test was explicitly
rejected as the standard under the Federal Constitution by the United
States Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard,5 it has recently been
reaffirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court under its state constitution. 2
50. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799
(Il1. 1961). In Pioneer Trust, a developer challenged the validity of an ordinance requiring
the dedication of public grounds as a condition of plat approval. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that while a municipality may require a developer to provide streets that a subdivision
requires, it cannot require a developer to provide a major thoroughfare, the need for which
stems from an entire community's activities. The court therefore held that the mandatory
dedication of land for educational purposes was unrelated to the developer's subdivision plat
and that an exaction may only be constitutional when it is within a municipality's statutory
grant of power and is specifically and uniquely attributable to a developer's activity. The court
stated:
If the requirement is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality and if
the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to his
activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to
a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions
rather than reasonable regulation under the police power.
Id. at 802.
51. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) ("We do not think the Federal Constitution requires such
exacting scrutiny, given the nature of the interests involved." Id. at 2319.)
52. See Northern Ill. Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384
(Ill. 1995).
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B. "Reasonable Relationship" Standard
Courts in other states, including California, New York, Kentucky,
Nebraska, and Texas, have traditionally applied the more liberal due
process "reasonableness" requirement for exercises of police power when
construing exactions." Under the "reasonable relationship" test, every
reasonable presumption is indulged in favor of the constitutionality of
the exaction, and if the ordinance bears any reasonable relation to the
public welfare and morals, the courts may not declare it to be invalid.'
According to the reasonable relationship test, if the constitutionality of
an ordinance is "fairly debatable," a court cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the legislative authority. Nonetheless, in light of the Supreme
Court's holdings in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission" and
Dolan v. City of Tigard,56 (discussed below), a more heightened level
of judicial scrutiny may be applied for development exactions. 7
C. "Rational Nexus" Standard
The "rational nexus" constitutional standard of reasonableness for
fees in lieu of dedication for off-site improvements was introduced in the
Wisconsin and New York courts in 1966. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls" held that fees in lieu of
dedication for off-site educational and recreational purposes were a valid
exercise of the police power if there was a reasonable connection
53. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971). In Walnut Creek. a
subdivider was required to dedicate land or pay fees in lieu of dedication for park or
recreational purposes. The landowner claimed that because the contribution would be used
to pay for public facilities that would be enjoyed by all citizens of the city, the taxpayers
should share the burden of the cost. The California Supreme Court disagreed and held that
the recreational facilities would be used for salutary purposes and were sufficiently related to
the health and welfare of the subdivision residents to justify the dedication requirement.
Moreover, the court reasoned that there was a reasonable relationship between the need for
the additional facilities and the growth generated by the subdivision because people in high
density areas will use the recreational facilities more than people with big private backyards.
54. See, e.g., Russ Bldg, Partnership v. San Francisco, 234 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1987)
(fee for mass transportation), aff'd and rev d in part, 750 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988); Ayres v. City
Council of L.A., 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949); Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966).
55. 485 U.S. 825 (1987).
56. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
57. But see Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992) (in which the court rejected the notion that stricter
scrutiny might apply to a linkage fee under Nollan).
58. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
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between the need for additional facilities and the growth generated by
the subdivision. 9 Funds earmarked for certain capital improvements
were also required to "substantially benefit" the development that paid
the fee. Whether the general public would incidentally benefit from the
planned capital facilities was not a factor that would affect the reason-
ableness of the fee requirement.
The principles that were set forth in Jordan are now applied in many
states and have been broken down into a two part standard: (1) there
must be a reasonable connection between the need for additional capital
facilities and the growth resulting from new development, and (2) there
must be a reasonable connection between the expenditure of the fees
collected and the facilities capacity provided thereby.' To meet the
first prong of the dual rational nexus test, an exaction ordinance should
indicate that the local government must expand its public facilities in
order to maintain current levels, or set new levels of service if new
growth and development are to be accommodated without decreasing
those levels of service. The local government should also be able to
demonstrate that the need for an increase in the public facilities is linked
to new growth and development. An exaction ordinance will satisfy the
second prong of the rational nexus test if the ordinance assures that the
feepayers will enjoy a benefit from the exaction expenditures. While the
benefit of public capital facilities, such as roadways, cannot always be
attributed to individual developments, the general community should
nonetheless benefit from the adequate provision of roadways. Once
these rational nexi are established, a payment requirement authorized by
the local government has the same presumption of validity under the
police power as other zoning and land use regulations, and the developer
has the burden of disproving its reasonableness. 6
More recently, in St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders
Ass'n,62 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the rational nexus test in a
case that involved the validity of educational facilities impact fees.
Taking each prong of the rational nexus test individually, the supreme
court first held that St. Johns County adequately demonstrated that there
is a reasonable connection or nexus between the need for additional
59. Id. at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
60. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Kan. City v. Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832
(Mo. 1977); Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
61. See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329
So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976) (upholding sewage impact fees).
62. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991). See Charles L. Siemon & Michelle J. Zimet, Who Should
Pay for Free Public Schools in an Expensive Society?, 20 STETSON L. REV. 3 (Summer 1991).
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schools and the growth in population in the county that will accompany
new development and that the ordinance, therefore, met the first prong
of the rational nexus test. The court made this decision based upon
language in the ordinance that states that the County "must expand its
educational facilities in order to maintain current levels of service if new
development is to be accommodated without decreasing current levels
of service."63 Further, the Court relied upon the calculations of the
County's expert who indicated that the fee was appropriately designed
to provide capacity to serve the educational needs of all the new
dwelling units in the County, regardless of when or whether that capacity
would be needed. The Court then stated that it believed that an impact
fee ordinance that operated county-wide (i.e., all municipalities
participating) could meet the second prong of the rational nexus test.
Any municipality that does not wish to participate must specifically opt
out of the impact fee ordinance by adopting a conflicting municipal
ordinance and must show a valid municipal purpose in its action.
D. Nollan and Dolan
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission' may have resulted in a blending of the distinc-
tions between the several different standards that courts apply to an
impact fee ordinance. In Nollan, the Court suggested that a heightened
standard of review should apply to land use regulations that involve the
actual conveyance of property and that go further than merely restricting
specific uses.65 The Court stated:
As indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridg-
ment of property rights through the police power as a "substantial
advanc[ing]" of a legitimate state interest. We are inclined to be
particularly careful about the adjective where the actual convey-
ance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use
restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the
purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather
than the stated police-power objective.66
In Nollan, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
development exactions in a case where the California Coastal Commis-
sion conditioned the issuance of a building permit for a single family
63. 583 So. 2d at 638.
64. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
65. Id. at 834-35.
66. Id. at 841.
[Vol. 79:759
IMPACT FEES FOR WISCONSIN
home on the dedication of an easement of access to and from on the dry
sand in front of an oceanfront lot. The California Coastal Commission
alleged that the purposes of the condition were to reduce any obstacles
to viewing the beach created by the new house, to lower any psychologi-
cal barriers to using the beach, and to remedy congestion along the
beach.6' The property owner argued that the exaction was unconstitu-
tional in violation of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. While
the Court believed that the Commission's reasons for requiring
dedication of the easement were a "legitimate state interest," it
nonetheless held that the condition itself did not sufficiently advance
those purposes. The Court responded:
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the
same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the
permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue
the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree. Thus, if the
Commission attached to the permit some condition that would
have protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstand-
ing construction of the new house - for example, a height
limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences - so long as the
Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have
assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether,
imposition of the condition would also be constitutional.6
Although the Supreme Court in Nollan did not openly endorse the
rational nexus standard, its analysis is nonetheless consistent with the use
of this standard in subdivision dedication cases in state courts.69 The
Supreme Court determined that there must be some "fit" between the
beach access condition imposed on the Nollans and the burden that their
new house creates or to which it contributes. However, the Court did
not find it necessary to discuss how close a fit is required because the
Justices found "that this case does not meet even the most untailored
standards."' The practical lesson of Nollan is that local governments
must be particularly careful when they impose land use regulations that
require the actual conveyance of private property for public use without
just compensation.
67. Id. at 835.
68. Id. at 836 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983): Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill.
1961); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966): Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
70. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
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The Supreme Court did elaborate on how strong the nexus between
the development condition and the public purpose must be to sustain an
exaction by impact in Dolan v. City of Tigard. In Dolan, the Court
enunciated a new two-part test for determining when an unconstitutional
exaction has occurred. First, an "essential nexus" must exist between a
legitimate government interest and the permit condition imposed by the
local government. Second, there must be a "rough proportionality"
between the exaction and the impact of the proposed development.
Applying this new test, the Supreme Court found that the City of Tigard,
Oregon had not justified its requirement that a store owner give up a
portion of her development site for a public bicycle path and drainage
improvements to an adjacent creek as a condition of a permit to double
the size of her hardware store.
In evaluating whether Tigard's planning commission's findings were
constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed on the
Dolans' building permit, the Supreme Court reviewed the standards by
which several different state courts have treated development exactions.
The Court observed that a wide spectrum exists in the manner in which
states have handled the issue of what is the necessary connection
between the required dedication and the proposed development. The
Court wrote that while a "very generalized statement" is too lax a
standard, the highly restrictive "specifically and uniquely attributable
test" is likewise unwarranted.
The Court determined that the reasonable relationship test, which
had been adopted by a majority of the state courts, was the closest to the
constitutional norm. Under this standard, a local government must
show a reasonable relationship between the required dedication and the
impact of the proposed development. However, the Court refused to
adopt the test as such, in part because the term "reasonable relationship"
is too easily confused with the term "rational basis" (the minimum level
of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause). Rather, the Court held:
We think a term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsu-
lates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the
city must make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development.73
71. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
72. Id. at 2319.
73. Id. at 2319-20.
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Of paramount importance to local governments, landowners, and
developers-and the issue that caused the rift between the majority and
dissenting justices-in elucidating what is now the standard for evaluating
development exactions, the Court shifted the burden so that governments
now have the responsibility of proving the constitutionality of an
exaction. Until this time, the burden of proving that the exaction would
take all (or substantially all) of the economically viable or beneficial use
of the property fell on the landowner challenging the land use regulation.
Now, a court must examine whether the government has justified its
exaction by making what the Court called an "individualized determina-
tion" that the condition satisfies the proportionality requirement.
The practical effect of Dolan is that local governments must make
some evaluation of the proposed development in relation to the exaction
to support the fact that the exaction is roughly proportional to the future
impacts of the proposed development. The question of precisely how
much planning is needed to satisfy the Court's standard will be debated
across the country, in every state and at every level of local government
in the upcoming years. What is certain, however, is that by shifting the
burden of proof from the property owner to the government, the
Supreme Court has established stricter limits on the ability of govern-
ments to place conditions on their approval of building permits. In
general, observations of Dolan can be categorized as follows:
A. While no precise mathematical calculation will be required to
justify land use restrictions, a government should attempt to
quantify its findings and should make an individual determination
of the relationship between the impact of the development and
the requirement imposed on the developer.
B. A government may rely on studies performed by other
communities in justifying its exactions, and developers may be
asked to supply additional information and prepare further
studies to assist the government in its planning efforts.
C. A government may not attach arbitrary conditions to a
building permit or to a variance even when it can rightfully deny
the application outright.
Again, however, development exactions and dedications no longer
have a presumption of constitutional validity and courts will use a
heightened level of scrutiny in their evaluation. Therefore, the local
government unit will have to show that the development condition
substantially advances a legitimate public purpose. And, the local
government unit will have to precisely document the costs to the public
that are generated by the development and the manner in which an
impact fee would alleviate those costs.
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In general, and as a form of summation of the constitutional
standards, state and federal case law have established four principles for
a constitutionally valid exaction. The fee must:
A. be reasonable, or substantially advance a legitimate public
interest and not exceed a proportionate share of the cost of
infrastructure improvements attributable to the feepayer's
development;
B. not be charged to remedy existing deficiencies, but be charged
only to provide public facilities for new development;
C. not duplicate other taxes or charges paid for the same public
facility, but subtract these other payments as a credit against the
exaction that would otherwise be due; and
D. be deposited in interest-bearing accounts, kept separate from
general revenues, and expended only for the types of improve-
ments specified in the exaction ordinance.
VI. RECOMMENDED PROVISIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF WISCON-
SIN LAW FOR IMPACT FEE ORDINANCES
Regardless of the judicial standard used to evaluate an exaction by
impact fees, Wisconsin local governments that decide to implement an
exaction program will have to consider a number of administrative issues
to ensure that their fees will be legally defensible if challenged in court.
While impact fees may be new to them, they can fortunately take
advantage of both the wisdom and mistakes of local governments
elsewhere that have survived such challenges.
As expressed earlier, the backbone of an exaction is not simply the
population or statistical data used to compute the fee schedule. Rather,
a defensible ordinance must accommodate due process, equal protection,
and other equity limitations, and most ordinances contain many
administrative procedures. The typical impact fee ordinance contains
explicit definitions; establishes the timing of assessments; includes a fee
schedule; and allows for fee agreements, individual assessment of impact,
refunds, credits, and exemptions to ensure that no developer is assessed
more than his or her fair share of the cost of capital facilities, which will
be paid for by the funds collected. Before an effective and enforceable
impact fee can be developed, several issues and policies should be
considered and resolved.
A. Land Development
One of the first issues that a local government will have to consider
in drafting an impact fee ordinance is the proposition of what actually
constitutes "land development." An impact fee is typically applied to all
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new development (with the exception of specified exemptions discussed
below). The statute defines "land development" as "the construction or
modification of improvements to real property that creates additional
residential dwelling units within a political subdivision or that results in
nonresidential uses that create a need for new, expanded or improved
public facilities within a political subdivision."'74 However, this statutory
definition is so broad that it does not address, for example, whether
additional accessory buildings that are constructed are an example of
development, and are therefore responsible for their fair share. 5
The definition should cover the need to assess a fee when significant
changes in use occur. The local government is free to include any
activities that can be shown to generate new development impacts, and
a careful definition in the regulations themselves will ease the adminis-
tration of the fee.
B. Public Facilities Needs Assessment
Before enacting an impact fee ordinance, the Wisconsin statute
requires the local government to conduct a "Public Facilities Needs
Assessment" of the capital facilities for which the impact fee is to be
levied. The Public Facilities Needs Assessment must include, but is not
limited to, the following:
1. An inventory of existing public facilities, including an identifi-
cation of any existing deficiencies in the quantity or quality of
those public facilities, for which it is anticipated that an impact
fee may be imposed.
2. An identification of the new public facilities, or improvements
or expansions of existing public facilities, that will be required
because of land development for which it is anticipated that
impact fees may be imposed. This identification shall be based
on explicitly identified service areas and service standards.
3. A detailed estimate of the capital costs of providing the new
public facilities or the improvements or expansions in existing
public facilities identified in subd. 2., including an estimate of the
effect of recovering these capital costs through impact fees on the
availability of affordable housing within the political subdivi-
sion.7 6
74. Wis. STAT. § 66.55(1)(d) (1993-94).
75. Typically, a definition of development would exclude accessory buildings and the
replacement of existing structures as long as there is no change in size or use from payment
of a fee.
76. Wis. STAT. § 66.55(4)(a) (1993-94).
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The amount of the impact fee will be based upon actual capital costs or
reasonable estimates of capital costs for the expansion of public facilities
that will be incurred by the local government unit as a result of
anticipated new development.
C. Impact Fee Zone(s)
Wisconsin Statutes section 66.55 (5) authorizes local government units
to impose different impact fees on different types of land development.
The local government units may delineate geographically defined zones
and impose impact fees that differ from zone to zone based upon the
Public Facilities Needs Assessment. The Needs Assessment explicitly
identifies the differences between the zones and justifies the amount of
impact fees imposed. Whether the local government unit in its entirety
could be considered a single impact fee zone, or whether the ordinance
would delineate geographically defined zones, must be determined. The
impact fee law does not state which factors warrant "special consider-
ation" in determining impact fees.
The Wisconsin impact fee law also does not identify the criteria the
local government unit should use in determining the boundaries of a
zone. Section 66.55 (5) (b) merely states: "the public facilities needs
assessment... shall explicitly identify the differences, such as land
development or the need for those public facilities, which justify the
differences between zones in the amount of impact fees imposed. 77
Whatever zone or zones the local government unit chooses to create, the
new development within that zone must be appropriately linked to the
impact fee charged.
Impact fee zones should be logically delineated on the basis of like
characteristics. Geographic features (i.e., natural boundaries) are often
key delineators. Market trade areas and travel patterns can also be used
to construct zones. Zones are occasionally related to urban-rural
boundaries. Input to the process of delineating zones includes existing
and potential municipal boundaries, development opportunity sites, land
cost characteristics, and land-use inventories.
D. Timing of Collection
After the effective date of an impact fee ordinance, any person or
governmental body who commences any impact-generating land
development activity identified in the ordinance will be obligated to pay
77. Id. § 66.55(5)(b).
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an impact fee. One of the issues that local governments must resolve is
when the fee should be collected. The statute contains very flexible
guidelines and provides that the fee shall be payable either in full or in
installment payments "before a building permit may be issued or other
required approval may be given by the political subdivision."78 The
impact fee will therefore be determined and paid at the time required in
the ordinance: it can be at the time of issuance of a building permit for
the development, at the time of plat approval, at the issuance of an
occupancy permit if properly guaranteed, or at another point in the
permitting process.
If the permit is for less than the entire development, the fee should
be computed separately for the amount of development covered by the
permit. The ordinance should provide that the obligation to pay the
impact fee runs to subsequent owners of the land. In addition, the
ordinance should contain an exception to the timing of the payment if
the local government obtains security ensuring the later payment of the
fee. The security may be in the form of a promissory note, cash bond,
security bond, an irrevocable letter of credit, or a lien or mortgage on
the lands to be covered by the building permit.
There are several benefits to collecting the impact fee at the time of
issuance of the building permit (versus the certificate of occupancy).
First, collection of the fee is generally easier to administer. Second, it
provides the local government additional lead time to collect monies for
construction or land acquisition. Third, collecting fees at the time the
certificate of occupancy is issued may cause problems for commercial
properties that are built and occupied in stages. The issue of phased
development, however, could pose similar problems when fees are
collected at the building permit stage. For example, when a large
development initially has a substantial vacancy rate, the developer might
find that paying fees at such an early time is overly burdensome.
E. Collection of Impact Fees: Inter-Local Agreements
County impact fees should involve municipal input and participation,
not only in the context of developing the impact fee ordinance, but also
in establishing specific procedures whereby the county and its municipali-
ties agree to cooperate in the collection of the impact fees. An inter-
local agreement (adopted under Wisconsin Statutes section 66.30) should
be developed between counties and their municipalities to provide a
78. Id. § 66.55(6)(g).
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cooperative, uniform, and cost effective procedure to collect impact fees
at the county level.
An inter-local agreement would set out the responsibilities of the
municipalities and the counties in implementing an impact fee program.
The terms of inter-local agreements that have been established in other
states generally require the municipality to establish an interest-bearing
account into which the impact fee funds are deposited. The municipali-
ties then remit the amount of the fees to the county, plus any interest
earnings collected, less administrative costs, usually on a monthly basis.
All the funds that are remitted to the county by the municipalities must
be used for the projects within the zone from which the funds were
collected.
E Fee Agreement
Fee agreements have been used in many communities to assist in
defining the time of payment as well as in pro-rating credits in large
scale developments. In these situations, at any time prior to issuance of
a building permit, the owner of property may enter into a fee agreement
with the local government providing for payment of the impact fee under
specified terms and conditions.
Any developer who agreed prior to the effective date of the impact
fee ordinance to pay impact fees, as a condition of development
approval, will be responsible for the payment of the fees under the terms
of the agreement. The payment of such fees by the developer will be
offset against any impact fees otherwise due at later stages of the
development activity for which the fee was paid. Any portion of the
impact fees agreed to be paid pursuant to a prior agreement that is
greater than the fees established in the impact fee ordinance will be
refunded. Any land or facilities agreed to be dedicated to the local
government unit as a condition of development approval will be
dedicated by either easement or deed, at the discretion of the local
government, no later than the time at which impact fees are required to
be paid under the ordinance.
G. Establishment of Fee Schedule and Periodic Review
Impact fee ordinances usually have a schedule of land use categories
with a fee attached to each category. In addition, such ordinances
typically provide a process whereby proposed land uses not identified in
the schedule may be interpreted, usually by the Planning Department,
so that the appropriate fee can be assigned. Frequently, such interpreta-
tions are appealable to the legislative body.
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The primary function of the fee schedule is to provide an easily
administered mechanism that ensures that the fees are consistent with
constitutional standards. The fee schedule is also developed so that
individual determinations do not have to be made for each new
development. Because the courts have accepted the use of average
costing methodologies to determine proportionate share, most impact fee
ordinances set forth a formula that applies various factors to compute the
fee. For example, a transportation impact fee formula would take into
account factors that include trip generation rates, trip length, capture and
diversion factors, and road and right-of-way costs.
Most impact fee ordinances also provide that the legislative body
would determine, usually on a bi-annual basis, whether any modifications
should be made to the fee schedule to reflect changes in the conditions.
The purpose of this periodic review is to analyze the effects of inflation
and other factors on the actual costs of facilities and to insure that the
fee charged will not exceed the pro rata share for the reasonably
anticipated expansion costs of facilities necessitated by the new
development.
In addition, once the capital improvements are completed, the
periodic review allows the local government to recalculate the fee using
the actual costs of the capital improvements or facility expansion. If the
impact fee calculated based on actual cost is less than the impact fee
paid, the impact fee ordinance may provide that the local government
shall refund the difference if the difference exceeds the impact fee paid
by more than a certain percentage (e.g. 10%).
H. Individual Assessment
Many impact fee ordinances also provide that a developer may
challenge the impact fee schedule by providing an individual impact
assessment. Individual assessments are usually used to determine
whether a fair share of the capital expansion costs, which the proposed
development necessitates, should be less than the fee established in the
ordinance's schedule. Many impact fee ordinances provide that the
impact fee may be computed by the use of an individual assessment of
impact if:
1. the type of development being commenced is not one of the
types listed on the fee schedule; or
2. the developer chooses to have the amount of the impact fee
determined by the use of an individual assessment of fiscal
impact; or
3. the local government's analysis of the proposed development
19961
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concludes that the nature, timing, or location of the proposed
development makes it likely to generate impacts costing substan-
tially more than the amount of the impact fee that would be
generated by the use of the fee schedule.
The developer is usually responsible for the preparation of the
individual assessment if he or she chooses to conduct the analysis. The
local government unit would be responsible for the preparation of the
individual assessment if the type of land development being proposed is
interpreted by the Planning Department staff not to be one of those
types listed in the fee schedule or if analysis of the proposed land
development concludes that the nature, timing, or location of the
proposed development make it likely to generate impacts costing
substantially more than the amount of the fee generated by the use of
the fee schedule. The regulations should require that the person who
conducts the individual assessment be a qualified professional in the
preparation of such analyses.
The ordinance should also require that the person who conducts the
individual assessment of fiscal impact should be a qualified professional
in the preparation of fiscal impact analyses. If the designated individual
within the local government unit is responsible for the preparation of the
assessment, he or she may request that the developer prepare the
individual assessment and credit the cost of such preparation against the
impact fee.
The individual assessment option is included in most impact fee
ordinances that utilize average cost fee schedules to ensure that the
ordinance will withstand a substantive due process challenge. Individual
assessments offer the developer the opportunity to prove that his or her
new development will have less impact on the public facilities system
than is determined in the fee schedule. If the local government
determines that the data, information, and assumptions used by the
applicant to calculate the assessment satisfy the requirements set out in
the ordinance for assessments, the fee determined will be due and owing
for the proposed land development activity. Such an adjustment in the
fee would usually be set forth in a fee agreement.
The individual fee calculations are based on data, information, or
assumptions contained in the impact fee ordinance, or the ordinance may
provide that independent sources may be used. However, the indepen-
dent source must either be an accepted standard source of engineering
or planning data or information, or a local study carried out by a
qualified planner or engineer pursuant to an accepted methodology of
planning or engineering. To ensure fairness in the process, the same
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formula used in developing the fee schedule must also be used in the
independent analysis, and a consistent and reasonable set of review
procedures should be established. Any person should be able to appeal
the decision on the individual assessment by filing a petition with the
legislative body. In reviewing the decision, the legislative body should
make written findings and conclusions of law and use the appropriate
constitutional standards for reasonableness described earlier in this
Article.
L Credits
The local government unit must provide credits for new development
against impact fees in instances where there have been contributions of
public facilities or money for public facilities that will be used to
accommodate new development. 9 Impact fees must also be reduced
to compensate for federal and state monies received "to provide or pay
for the public facilities for which the impact fees are imposed."8 Any
person who initiates any impact generating land development activity
may apply for a credit against the impact fee for any contribution,
payment, construction, or dedication of land that the local government
accepts and receives for the targeted capital facilities improvements. The
determination of credits usually occurs at the time of the calculation of
the amount of the impact fee.
The rationale for granting credits is based on the proportionate share
principles discussed above in the impact fee case law. The use of impact
fees requires a fiscal assessment of the cost of public facilities needed to
serve new development and the proportionate share of those needs that
are attributable to a particular development, less the credits which that
development would generate. This net proportionate cost forms the
basis for determining the fiscal impact of the development on the
community's public facilities. For example, if a new development that
is subject to impact fees is also generating tax revenues that are being
used to construct public facilities or pay debt service on outstanding
bonds for capital facilities, the new development will be contributing
twice for the same public facility without a credit.
In order to avoid legal challenges for such a double payment
situation, the local government unit should deduct the present value of
other revenues generated by the new development from the impact fees
79. Wis. STAT. § 66.55(2)(b), (6)(d) (1993-94).
80. Id. § 66.55(6)(e).
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on the new development when the two sources of revenues are used to
meet the same local need. The types of credits that should be consid-
ered depend on the local government's taxing scheme and on the type
of fee which is charged. For instance, a local government with a
transportation impact fee would probably be concerned with gas tax
credits to the extent that those gas taxes are used for road improvements
or right-of-way costs.
J. Earmarking of Funds
Any fees collected pursuant to an impact fee ordinance must be
expressly designated for the accommodation of impacts reasonably
attributable to the proposed development. Separate accounts or trust
funds should be established to insure that the fees collected pursuant to
an ordinance are designated for the accommodation of impacts
reasonably attributable to the proposed development. Proceeds collected
and all interest accrued on such funds should be used exclusively for
capital expansion of the facilities in the impact fee zone from which they
were collected."1
Any proceeds in the trust fund account on deposit that are not
immediately necessary for expenditure must be invested in interest
bearing accounts. All income derived from these investments should be
retained in a segregated account.8 Each year when the annual budget
is reviewed, the local government unit should propose appropriations to
be spent from the segregated account to the legislative body. After
review of the recommendations, the legislative body should then either
approve, modify, or deny the recommended expenditures of the
segregated account monies. Any amounts not appropriated from the
segregated account, together with any interest earnings, should be carried
over in the specific segregated account to the following fiscal period.
As discussed earlier, case law requires that the impact fees collected
must be limited to a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of
construction and expansion. Under each of the reasonableness tests, the
impact fee must be adequately related to the needs for additional
facilities generated by new development, and the money collected must
be used to benefit the new development.83 The ordinance must,
therefore, provide that the fees collected be earmarked to pay for
facilities that will benefit the feepayers. These fees may not exceed the
81. Id. § 66.55(8).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 66.55(6)(c).
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proportionate share of the capital costs that are required to serve land
development, as compared to existing uses of land within the political
subdivision.' The time limit on the use of the funds should be
specifically identified in the ordinance to ensure that the funds are spent
within a reasonable length of time. Most of the court cases have
approved the use of a segregated trust fund for the purpose of ensuring
that the fees collected pursuant to the impact fee ordinance are
designated for accommodation of impacts reasonably attributable to the
development upon which the fee was levied.
K. Refund of Impact Fees
As an additional assurance that the developer pay only his or her fair
share of the cost of capital facilities construction or expansion, most
ordinances allow for the refund of the monies collected if the fees have
not been spent on targeted capital improvements within a specified time
frame or if the approved development is canceled before construction
has commenced. The ordinance must specify that impact fees that are
imposed and collected by the local government units, but not used within
a reasonable period of time after they are collected, will be refunded to
the current owner of the property. The ordinance must also specify
reasonable time periods within which impact fees must be spent or
refunded. The local government units must consider what are appropri-
ate planning and financing periods in determining the length of time
periodsY The refund provisions should also provide that the refund
includes simple interest.
In certain situations, it may be desirable to also provide for an
extension of the date that fees must be refunded. Such an extension
should be limited to those situations where a finding is made that within
such an extended period, specified transportation capital improvements
are planned and evidenced by the adoption and incorporation of the
plans into the Needs Assessment, that these transportation capital
improvements will be constructed within such extended period, that these
improvements are reasonably attributable to the feepayer's development,
and that the fees with an extended time of refund will be spent for these
transportation capital improvements. Fees are usually deemed spent on
the basis that the first fee collected is the first spent.
84. Id. § 66.55(6)(b).
85. Id. § 66.55(9).
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L. Exemptions
Some ordinances also exempt certain types of new development from
payment of their fair share of the impact fee. Early impact fees usually
applied to all new development, or to a broad category of new develop-
ment, such as new residential or office or commercial development. For
equitable reasons, many modern impact fee ordinances now exempt a
narrow class of land uses in order to avoid the harsh impact of develop-
ment fees on less-profitable, socially beneficial land uses. These
exempted developments often include government buildings and
affordable housing, thus encouraging certain housing development that
ensures both the long-term integrity of an area and accommodates
regional growth influences.86
Exemptions generally imply a willingness by the local government to
decrease the amount of funds collected on behalf of the capital facility
in order to provide adequate public facilities for the targeted group. The
impact of exemption policies must be clearly articulated so that the
purpose of the compromise is clearly understood. Also, it is important
to calculate exemptions with caution to ensure that the deficit the
exemptions create will not be absorbed by other developers who remain
subject to the fee. Wisconsin Statutes section 66.55 (7) provides that:
An ordinance enacted under this section may provide for an
exemption from, or a reduction in the amount of, impact fees on
land development that provides low-cost housing, except that no
amount of an impact fee for which an exemption or reduction is
provided under this subsection may be shifted to any other
development in the land development in which the low-cost
housing is located or to any other land development in the
political subdivision.87
The legal issues that would likely be raised in a lawsuit challenging
impact fee exemptions are whether the local government has the
authority to exempt some land users from the impact fees and whether
the exemption violates the state's and the federal equal protection
clauses.
86. For example, in Monroe County, Florida, developers are exempt from paying impact
fees if they construct affordable housing units, and public governmental buildings are also
exempt. See Monroe County, Fla. Comprehensive Plan Land Development Regulations, vol.
III, ch. 12, § 101-05 (1986). Other exemptions have been provided for single family dwelling
units in the Pinelands, New Jersey, when municipal ordinances would otherwise have
interfered with a community's development objectives. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7.50, § 5.22
(1982).
87. Wis. STAT. § 66.55 (7) (1993-94).
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1. Affordable Low Cost Housing Exemptions
Because impact fees may increase the cost of new housing, some
jurisdictions have exempted affordable housing from the payment of
impact fees. Wisconsin and Vermont, for example, are states that
expressly authorize the exemption of affordable low cost housing in their
impact fee enabling legislation.' In other jurisdictions that do not
expressly authorize impact fee exemptions, the exemption of affordable
housing development would have to be based upon the local govern-
ment's overall objective of planning comprehensively for the orderly
growth and development of the community, including the encouragement
of a variety of housing types. In Wisconsin, the new impact fee statute
expressly states that an ordinance may offer an exemption from, or a
reduction in the amount of; impact fees for land development that
provides low-cost housing. 9
Exempting affordable housing from impact fee regulations is an
intuitive technique to encourage the construction of affordable housing
development. Exemptions imply that a community is willing to
aggressively promote the construction of adequate housing for its lower
income residents. However, exemption policies should clearly be
articulated in the local government's plans so that the purpose and
rationale of the approach are clearly understood.
Recognition should be given to the fact that the affected agency will
need to fund the exempt development's share of the system improve-
ments through a revenue source other than impact fees. Exemptions
should be carefully calculated to ensure that the deficit created by the
exemptions will not be absorbed by other types of development that
remain subject to the fee. Moreover, as described above, if exemptions
are determined to be appropriate, the agency must determine whether
exemptions should be applied generally, by individual district, or based
on the needs of individual developers or developments.
An affordable low cost housing exemption would likely withstand a
constitutional equal protection challenge as long as the local government
can demonstrate that exemption of that particular class of development
is rationally related to some legitimate government purpose, such as
planning objectives, rather than for the sole purpose of creating a
financial subsidy for the exempt land use. The United States Supreme
88. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5205 (1994).
89. Wis. STAT. § 66.55 (7).
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Court has emphasized that where no "suspect class" (e.g., race,
nationality, or alienage) or fundamental right is at stake, a government
need only show that its classification is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.' To date, neither the federal nor any state courts
have held affordable housing to be a fundamental right. Thus, a court
would apply the same constitutional analysis that would be applied to
determine the validity of many other types of police power or economic
regulations. The only role of the courts would be to determine whether
the governing body enacting the impact fee ordinance could rationally
have decided that the exemption of affordable housing developments
would achieve a legitimate public purpose.
2. Exemptions for Public Buildings and Private Non-Profit Organiza-
tions
Public schools, other public buildings, and non-profit organizations
have sometimes also been exempted from impact fees. There is no
difference in the legal requirements for the exemption of not-for-profit
organizations and other types of exemptions. Unless a statute infringes
on a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class, differen-
tial treatment of a regulated class will be judged under the less stringent
rational basis equal protection standard.
The exemption of public buildings and private non-profit organiza-
tions will be constitutionally valid if it is reasonably related to compre-
hensive land use planning objectives. Further, as in the case of
affordable housing, a local government must be able to demonstrate that
non-exempt land uses are not subsidizing the exempted land uses. It is
important to note, however, that many not-for-profit institutions have at
least as great an impact on road systems and other public facilities as
other land uses, and it may therefore be difficult to provide the necessary
reasonable relationship that would be required to justify the exemption.
Furthermore, because the United States Constitution mandates the
separation of church and state, the exemption of religious institutions
only, without any similar exemption for other institutions, from the
payment of impact fees is likely to be strictly scrutinized by the courts.
However, if some non-religious institutions were exempt as well, the
claim of government favoritism of churches would be weakened.
90. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93 (1979); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
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M. Retroactive Application
Whenever laws affecting development are modified, some developers
will inevitably be caught with projects in the "pipeline," - that is, the
developers will have received some government approval (e.g., site plan,
rezoning), but they still will require additional authorization (e.g., a
building permit or certificate of occupancy). An impact fee ordinance
should therefore clearly indicate when a developer will not be subject to
the impact fee because the project is at such an advanced stage of
development that his or her right to develop without paying fees will be
considered vested. The local government unit must decide whether it
wants to charge impact fees to developers whose projects are close to
completion (or have just recently been finished), or whether fees will
only be imposed on developers whose developments are still on the
drawing board.
One of the issues that arises in adopting an impact fee ordinance is
whether the "vested rights" concepts that have been applied to changes
in zoning laws will apply to the adoption of impact fees. Under the most
common type of vested rights case, a court would be asked to determine
the point in time, if any, at which a developer's right to proceed under
an old zoning ordinance, which is superseded by new zoning regulations,
becomes vested.9' The rule in most states is that a developer does not
acquire any vested rights to proceed under the rules in effect at the time
the development was approved unless a building permit was issued and
the developer made "substantial expenditures" in reliance on the permit.
In Lake Bluff, however, after considering an unusual level of pre-zoning
change, planning activity, and expense, the court concluded that rights
can be vested in a zoning designation even absent the issuance of a
building permit. The court articulated the following principles:
(1) a property owner can have vested rights in a planned building
before actual construction begins; (2) 'retrospective effect' of an
ordinance is 'not favored, and this is especially true where vested
rights are affected;' and (3) conceptually, vested rights can be
separated from zoning compliance. That is, a court can conclude
that a property owner has a vested right to build, contingent on
compliance with previously existing restrictions.92
91. See, e.g., Lake Bluff Hous. Partners v. City of S. Milwaukee, 188 Wis. 2d 230, 525
N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 540 N.W.2d 189 (1996).
92. Id. at 250,525 N.W.2d at 67. See also State ex rel Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wahner,
25 Wis. 2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304 (1964); Rosenberg v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214,225
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In general, local government units should face few legal obstacles to
imposing impact fees on developments "in the pipeline." There is no
automatic right to have the exaction regulations in effect at the time of
project commencement applied at its conclusion. In fact, the law is
relatively clear that all property is subject to an exercise of the police
power, regardless of a developer's expectations.93 In the absence of a
statutory provision that protects a developer's right to complete a
previously planned and approved development without change in the
rules, the developer's only real recourse is to seek a judicial declaration
that his or her development rights are vested.
The concept of vested rights has been developed by the courts in
response to the inevitable changeability of local land use regulations.94
Generally, the vested rights concept stops a land use regulatory authority
from applying new or changed regulations to a previously approved
development where a landowner has, in good faith, relied to his or her
substantial detriment on the approval. The landowner must show that
it would be highly inequitable to deny him or her the right to complete
the project as originally approved. The difficulty is that what is
"substantial," what is "good faith," and what is "highly inequitable" are
subjective issues that to date have only been resolved on an ad hoc
basis.95
In general, in vested rights or estoppel cases, the courts try to balance
the developer's economic injury against the public interest served by the
regulation. The local government unit should take advantage of the
opportunity to exercise some foresight when addressing this important
issue of development expectations. Developers should be alerted to
these potential conflicts concerning vested rights before an impact fee
ordinance takes effect. By working together, the local government unit
N.W. 838 (1929); Building Height Cases, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923).
93. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
94. For a comprehensive discussion of vested rights principles and cases, see CHARLES
L. SIEMON ET AL., VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
EXPECTATIONS (1982).
95. Although it has never been established that traditional vesting rules apply to impact
fees, a Florida case, Key West, Fla. v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 536 So. 2d 641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
upheld the city's right to require a developer to pay development fees pursuant to an
ordinance adopted after a building permit had been issued and a substantial number of units
had been constructed. This case illustrates the developers' potential liability for impact fees
even after their developments have been approved. See also Russ Bldg. Partnership v. San
Francisco, 750 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988) (new mass transportation fees held not violative of vested
rights because terms of permits issued contemplated that developers would pay the fee).
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and its developers should be able to stave off this type of costly and
risky litigation.
N. Appeals Procedure
To ensure fairness in the process, the same formula used in develop-
ing the fee schedule should also be used in the independent analysis, and
a consistent and reasonable set of review procedures should be
established. Under Wisconsin Statutes section 66.55 (10), the ordinance
must specify a procedure under which a developer on whom an impact
fee is imposed has the right to contest the amount, collection, or use of
the impact fee. 6 The procedure should provide for commencement of
the review of individual assessments by filing a petition for review with
the local government unit. Throughout the review and appeals
procedure, local government officials should prepare written findings of
fact and conclusions of law and use the appropriate constitutional
standards to establish reasonableness.
VII. CONCLUSION
State and local governments are responding to infrastructure funding
problems and the implications of inadequate public facilities on the
quality of life in their communities. Many governments have begun to
explore alternative funding sources, such as impact fees, as a means of
ensuring sufficient funding to finance capital facilities needed to support
their new growth and development. Development impact fees are a
popular, useful, and necessary mechanism for financing public facilities.
The Wisconsin Impact Fee Law follows the national trend and
provides the basic authority and requirements for local government units
to enact impact fee ordinances. The validity of such ordinances will be
based upon compliance with the statutory and constitutional require-
ments set forth in this Article. Impact fee ordinances that are properly
drafted in compliance with the necessary statutory and case law
requirements will be enforceable. Impact fees have been challenged and
sustained nationwide and are now prevalent in Wisconsin.97
With few or no revenues to expand facilities commensurate with new
development, local governments face unpleasant dilemmas. Without
growth, they face economic and fiscal stagnation. Without new facilities,
96. Wis. STAT. § 66.55(10) (1993-94).
97. For example, as the chart in Appendix II demonstrates, within Waukesha County,
Wisconsin alone, over thirty local governments have already enacted various types of impact
fees or exactions. See infra Appendix II.
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they can have no growth. If growth occurs in the absence of new or
expanded facilities, local taxpayers correctly perceive that new develop-
ment is associated with lower quality of life. However, despite their
significant need for new revenues, local government officials should not
only comply with the statutory and case law requirements, but should
also carefully evaluate the effect of an impact fee ordinance on economic
development and affordable, low cost housing. The process of enacting
development impact fees should therefore involve a genuine balancing
of interests.
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